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One of the fundamental questions in neurobiology con-
cerns how different regions of the mammalian cerebral
cortex develop their speciﬁcity. This question is particu-
larly important for human cognitive neuroscience were
regions of cortex collaboratively support “higher” cognitive
Cognitiv
gap that currently exists between cognitive theories and
neural observations.
With regard to the second dimension of difference, the-
ories in developmental cognitive neuroscience potentially8 M.H. Johnson / Developmental
functions not seen in most other mammals, and in which
brain development is very prolonged continuing over the
ﬁrst two decades of postnatal life. This basic question in
neurobiology underpins all human adult cognitive neuro-
science studies in which particular cognitive functions are
localized to areas of cortex, and is also of potential impor-
tance to future educational and clinical strategies. Further,
relating evidence on the neuroanatomical development of
the brain to the remarkable changes in motor, perceptual,
and cognitive abilities during the ﬁrst decade or so of a
human life presents a considerable challenge of relevance
to the new ﬁeld of developmental cognitive neuroscience.
As a newly emerging ﬁeld of science, developmen-
tal cognitive neuroscience can appear to students and
experts alike as rather fragmentary, with different types
of local hypotheses being used to motivate particular sets
of studies, and domain or region-speciﬁc local theories
being used to account for isolated islands of data (often
from one lab). With rapid advances in the technology for
tracing the genetic and neural basis of typical and atyp-
ical cognitive development, many intuitively surprising
observations remain unexplained. How are we to come to
understand these surprising observations, and to interpret
andexplain themwithinabroader context of otherﬁndings
with different methods and populations?
Interdisciplinary ﬁelds such as developmental cognitive
neuroscience face a formidable challenge in the develop-
ment of adequate theories since scientists are required
to construct theories that not only cross different levels
of observation (such as genetic, neural and behavioural),
but that also relate those different levels together in some
coherent way. For a variety of reasons that I have discussed
elsewhere (Johnson, in press), I suggest that developmen-
tal cognitive neuroscience theories should relate evidence
from different levels of observation in terms of one level of
explanation.
For several decades in the parent discipline ﬁeld
of cognitive development it was generally considered
inappropriate to attempt to relate different levels of
observation. Rather, the aim was to explain one level of
observation (change in behaviour) in terms of one level of
explanation (cognitive). This view was taken for a variety
of reasons, but one inﬂuential source was the work of Marr
(1982). Marr argued that, because the same computation
can, in principle, be implemented on different computer
or neural architectures, a computational account of cogni-
tion could, and should, be constructed independently from
the details of its implementation on hardware. This inﬂu-
ential argument led to the view that considering the role
of the brain in cognitive development was reductionist in
the sense thatmolecular and cellular processes could never
provide an adequate explanation of cognitive processes.
While the case against an eliminative reductionist view
(Churchland, 1986) is clearly correct, theories of biological
development critically need to explain the reverse pro-
cess (to reductionism) of the emergence of higher order
structures of organization. Thus, while not denying Marr’s
anti-reductionist point, constructing a speciﬁc type of neu-
ral computer hardware will constrain the range of possible
computations that could potentially be supported. With
these considerations in mind, Mareschal et al. (2007),e Neuroscience 1 (2011) 7–21
among others, argue that there are important constraints
on computation imposed by its detailed implementation.
Further, when attempting to bridge levels of explanation,
mechanistic accounts of processes of computation and
developmental change should be consistent across different
levels, i.e. there is a need for isomorphismbetween levels of
description. Since the overall goal of developmental cogni-
tive neuroscience is to relate the genetic, neural, cognitive
and behavioural accounts of human development, devis-
ing theories that speciﬁcally relate the different levels of
observation seems crucial.
Theories come in different shapes and sizes. Speciﬁ-
cally, the amount and range of developmental cognitive
neuroscience data accounted for can independently vary
along at least two dimensions: (a) how many levels of
observation are incorporated or integrated, and (b) how
domain-speciﬁc or domain-general (domain here is used
in a general sense to refer to a facet of cognition) a the-
ory is. It is a deﬁning feature of developmental cognitive
neuroscience, as opposed to traditional cognitive develop-
ment, that multiple levels of observation are considered
and related in terms of a single process or causal mecha-
nism. One reason for this is that the parent discipline of
cognitive development had been built on the strategy of
explaining changes in behaviour during development in
terms of cognition – a level of observation that is not itself
directly observable. While the scientiﬁc strategy of theo-
rizing at a level that is not directly observable is not unique
to cognitive psychology, constraining theories of this kind
by only one level of explanation is high-risk due to the
lack of constraints it imposes.1 In other words, a very wide
variety of theories can successfully account for data at one
level of observable only. For example, some of the same
behavioural phenomena used to motivate arguments for
the existence of “innate core knowledge” modules for geo-
metric space and number can also be observed in day-old
chicks and ﬁsh, as well as in human infants (Spelke and
Kinzler, 2007). Given the radically different brains in these
widely diverging species, it is evident that this kind of cog-
nitive theory is not initally constrained by evidence about
the underlying neural architecture.2
In cognitive neuroscience it is assumed that a better
strategy is to sandwich a non-observable level of expla-
nation between two levels of observable, such as those of
brain and behaviour. With these considerations in mind,
I have discussed different general theories of functional
brain development designed to account for observable phe-
nomena that underpin perceptual, motor, and cognitive
processing (Johnson, 2001). These general theories are not
intended to replace descriptions from cognitive models, or
lower-level neural accounts, but rather to bridge the large1 Similar criticisms have been levelled at some theoretical claims in
“evolutionary psychology”.
2 Albeit that corroboratingevidence fromneurophysiology isnowbeing
collected.
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ary enormously in the scope of data that they account for
rom a single cognitive domain in a single population, to an
ccount that crosses domains of cognition and populations
such as comparing typical and atypical development).
ften, in biology the broader the scope of a theory, the
ess clearly it makes detailed domain-speciﬁc predictions.
hus, some have referred to such broad-scope theories
s “frameworks” or “general theories”. Put simply, frame-
orks are ways of thinking about, or viewpoints on, a large
ody of data (Morton and Frith, 1995). Frameworks have
estable elements, but primarily serve as a coherent set of
ssumptions that, taken together, offer anaccountof awide
ange of phenomena. In addition,within a frameworkmore
peciﬁc and detailed theories can be constructed. Further,
eneral theories guide lines of research and the kinds of
ypotheses that are explored.
In what follows I advance a domain-general framework
or motivating and interpreting large bodies of data on
he postnatal development of human brain functions. In
revious publications I have presented different compo-
ents of this framework (Johnson, 2000, 2001), focussed
n applying it to speciﬁc domains of perception or cogni-
ion (Johnson et al., 2009), or to developmental disorders
Johnson et al., 2002). In the present paper I speciﬁcally
ocus on assessing evidence from developmental imag-
ng across different domains of cognition, to ascertain the
xtent to which it can plausibly be considered as a candi-
ate domain-general framework.
. Three frameworks for understanding human
unctional brain development
Previous reviews of the literature in developmental
ognitive neuroscience revealed that three different frame-
orks on human postnatal functional brain development
re currently commonly adopted (Johnson, 2001). The
rst general theory that captures many implicit assump-
ions I have termed the Maturational Viewpoint. In general,
he maturational viewpoint seeks to interpret emerging
ensory,motor and cognitive functions in terms of themat-
ration of particular regions of the brain, usually speciﬁc
reas of cerebral cortex. An area is said to be mature when
t achieves the adult state of functioning, with any different
tate of functioning classiﬁed as being immature. An area
eachingmaturity is a one-off event, sometimes considered
o have a sudden or non-linear onset (as opposed to the
lower and more graded transitions attributed to learning)
nd to be caused by intrinsic genetic, biochemical, and/or
euroanatomical change.
Much of the research to date attempting to relate
rain to behavioural development in humans has taken
his approach. Evidence concerning the differential neu-
oanatomical development of brain regions should then
redict the age when a particular region is likely to become
unctional. Conversely, success in a new behavioural task
t given age is attributed to the maturation of a new
rain region. Functional brain development is in this sense
epicted as the reverse of adult neuropsychological studies
f patients with brain damage, with speciﬁc brain regions
eing added-in during development (with the converse
ffects from being deleted by damage).e Neuroscience 1 (2011) 7–21 9
Despite the initial appeal of the maturational approach,
it does not successfully explain many initially surprising
observations on human functional brain development. For
example, recent evidence suggests that someof the regions
that are slowest to develop by neuroanatomical criteria
(such as prefrontal cortex) can be activated from shortly
after birth and appear to mediate cognitive functions even
before they would be considered anatomically mature
(for review see Johnson, 2011). Thus, the emergence of
new behaviours is not necessarily linked to a previously
immature, “silent” neural region becoming active when it
matures. Another difﬁculty for the maturational viewpoint
as a satisfactory explanation is that associations between
neural and cognitive changes based on age of onset or tran-
sition are theoretically weak due to the great variety of
neuroanatomical andneurochemicalmeasures that change
at different times in different regions of the brain. Thus,
as the brain is continuously developing into adulthood, it
is nearly always possible to ﬁnd a potential neural corre-
late for any behavioural change in development. It is then
tempting to jump to theassumption that this neural change
causes the behavioural change in question. Finally, there is
increasing evidence for neuronal changes caused through
selective exchangeswith the environment, and consequent
experience-dependent plasticity.
A second general theory I have termed Skill Learning.
Skill learning involves the proposal that the brain regions
active in infants during the onset of new perceptual or
motor abilities are similar, or even identical to, those
involved in complex skill acquisition in adults. While the
natureof the skills tobeacquiredchangewithdevelopment
(from basic sensory and motor skills, to complex cognitive
ones), the challenge to the brain at a givenpoint in develop-
mentmay be equivalent. For example, Gauthier andNelson
(2001) speculate that development of face processing dur-
ing infancy and childhood proceeds in a similar manner to
acquisition of perceptual expertise for a novel visual cat-
egory in adults. Similarly, prefrontal cortex may be more
heavily engaged in simple tasks early in life (see later) due
to its important role in skill acquisition. Different versions
of skill acquisition propose different degrees of prespeciﬁ-
cation for the neural circuitry that underlies skill learning,
with someproponentspreferring to focuson inherent com-
putational principles that maximise the brains ability to
learn (for reviews see Spencer et al., 2009).
A third general theory is Interactive Specialization (IS)
(Johnson, 2000, 2001). As reﬂected in its name, two key
ideas underlie this approach. The ﬁrst is the notion that
during postnatal development changes in the response
properties of some cortical regions occur as they inter-
act and compete with each other to acquire their role in
new computational abilities. From this perspective, some
cortical regions begin with poorly deﬁned and broad func-
tionality, and consequently are partially activated in awide
range of different stimuli and task contexts. During devel-
opment, activity-dependent interactions between regions
sharpens up the functions and response properties of cor-
tical regions such that their activity becomes restricted to
a narrower set of circumstances (e.g. a region originally
activated by a wide variety of visual objects, may come
to conﬁne its response to upright human faces). In other
Cognitiv10 M.H. Johnson / Developmental
words, somecortical regionsbecomemorespecializedwith
development.3 This process mirrors that known to occur
at a cellular level during development, in which receptive
or activity ﬁelds become increasingly ﬁne-grained during
development (e.g. Wills et al., 2010). The second aspect to
Interactive Specialization is that postnatal functional brain
development, at least within cerebral cortex, involves a
process of organizing patterns of inter-regional interac-
tions. According to this view, the response properties of
a speciﬁc cortical region are partly determined by its pat-
terns of connectivity to other regions, and their patterns of
activity. The onset of new behavioural competencies dur-
ing infancy will therefore be associated with changes in
activity over several regions (networks), and not just by
the onset of activity in one or more additional region(s).
3. Assumptions underlying Interactive
Specialization
Elsewhere, I have discussed at length the different sets
of key assumptions that underlie the three frameworks
above (Johnson et al., 2002). Thus, for the present I will
only brieﬂy review assumptions critical for the IS theory
that contrast with one or both of the other accounts.
• Circular causality: The IS framework adopts Gottlieb’s
“probabilistic epigenesis” view of development. Gottlieb
(1992, 2007) distinguished between two approaches to
the study of development, deterministic epigenesis in
which it is assumed that there is a unidirectional causal
path from genes to structural brain changes and then
to psychological function, and probabilistic epigenesis
in which interactions between genes, structural brain
changes, and psychological function are viewed as bi-
directional, dynamic and emergent. The latter has also
been referred to as “circular causality” in recent litera-
ture. In contrast, deterministic epigenesis is a key feature
of the maturational approach as deﬁned here; region-
speciﬁc gene expression is assumed to effect changes in
intra-regional connectivity that, in turn, allowsnewfunc-
tions to emerge. By this view, cause runs from gene to
brain structure to brain function to behaviour.
• Interactivity and brain networks: This assumption of the IS
approach is that the specialization of a cortical regions is
determinedwithin the context of its neighbours and con-
nection patterns. In this respect, IS follows recent trends
in the adult functional neuroimaging literature (Bressler
and Menon, 2010) in which the response properties of a
cortical region are determined by its patterns of connec-
tivity to other regions as well as by their own current
activity. Extending these ideas to development, the IS
approach emphasizes that the emerging specialization
of regions is inﬂuenced by changes in the inter-regional
connectivity of the region in question. In contrast to this,
explicit versions of the maturational view often appeal
to neuroanatomical or neurochemical changes intrinsic
to the region in question. Thus, the maturational view
3 I note that the opposite process (“de-differentiation”) may occur in
later life aging.e Neuroscience 1 (2011) 7–21
is more akin to a “mosaic” in which the developmen-
tal fate of each cortical region is independent of that
of its neighbours (i.e. different and independent timeta-
bles for different regions), whereas in the IS framework
region-region interactions are critical in determining
developmental fate (Elman et al., 1996; Kingsbury and
Finlay, 2001). The focus on interactions between regions
is consistent with the emergence of networks to support
cognitive functions, as opposed to the focus on the emer-
gence of functionality in individual regions characteristic
of the maturational approach (Kanwisher, 2010). Recent
literature has also discriminated between the processes
of segregation and integration in human functional brain
development (Fair et al., 2007). Segregationmay relate to
the increased tuning within regions, whereas integration
may result from the specialization of networks of regions
(see later for discussion).
• Self-organizing and activity-dependent process: This
assumption stands in stark contrast to the traditional
view of functional brain development as the passive
unfolding of a genetic blueprint or plan. The idea
that biological development in complex organisms
involves processes of self-organization is an old one
(e.g. Waddington, 1975). When applied to functional
brain development it suggests that the brain at one age
may actively seek out the information it requires for
its own further development, e.g. by directing sensory
organs to slightly novel stimuli or environments. The
assumption that human functional brain development
is an activity-dependent process is also consistent with
much evidence from developmental neuroscience (e.g.
Stellwagen and Shatz, 2002). It is important to note that,
even postnatally, the activity that shapes functional
specialization can be intrinsic to the brain and is not
necessarily directly evoked in response to environmental
stimuli (see later discussion).
• Dynamic mapping between brain and cognition: A fourth
underlying assumption concerns the mapping between
cognitive functions and their neural substrate in the cor-
tex. A necessary assumption within the maturational
approach as presented here is that there is a one-to-one
mapping between brain regions and particular cogni-
tive functions, such that speciﬁc computations come
“on-line” following the maturation of circuitry intrinsic
to the corresponding cortical region. Similarly, explana-
tionswithinamaturational approachdependondifferent
cortical regions being assumed to have different matura-
tional timetables, thus enabling new cognitive functions
to emerge at different ages. In contrast the IS and skill
learning frameworks assume a dynamic and changing
mapping between cognitive functions and their neural
substratewith development.Whendiscussing functional
imagingofdevelopmentaldisorders, Johnsonetal. (2002)
point out that many laboratories have assumed that
the relation between brain structure and cognitive func-
tion is unchanging during development. Speciﬁcally, in
accord with the maturational view, when new struc-
tures come on line, the existing (already mature) regions
continue to support the same functions they did at ear-
lier developmental stages. This assumption is partly why
it is acceptable to study developmental disorders in
Cognitiv
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or behaviour will be accompanied by widespread changes
acrossmultiple regions. Networks of regionswill adjust the
response properties of component regions to increase or
optimise their overall functioning.
4 Joseph et al. (2010) use a more complex taxonomy to characterise
different levels of speciﬁcity of responses in cortical tissue. My usage of
stimulus-selective corresponds to their categories of preferential and selec-
tive responding in relation to faces, i.e. a brain region shows a signiﬁcantlyM.H. Johnson / Developmental
adulthood and then extrapolate back in time to early
development (Karmiloff-Smith, 2009). Contrary to this
view, the IS approach suggests that when a new com-
putation or skill is acquired, there is a re-organization
of interactions between brain different structures and
regions. This re-organization process could even change
how previously acquired cognitive functions are rep-
resented in the brain. Thus, the same behaviour could
potentially be supported by different neural substrates
at different ages during development.
Stating that structure–function relations can change
ith development is all verywell, but it lacks the speciﬁcity
equired to make all but the most general predictions. For-
unately, the view that there is competitive specialization
f regions during development gives rise to expectations
bout the types of changes in structure–function relations
hat should be observed. These predications from the IS
heory will be outlined and assessed in subsequent sec-
ions.
At this point it is important to acknowledge that some
peciﬁc elements of the IS framework are related to other
deas and hypotheses that have been advanced in the
eld. For example, and in approximate chronological order,
deas relating selectionism to synaptic pruning (Kerszberg
t al., 1992), hypotheses on the increasing localization of
anguage areas (Neville et al., 1992), the “perceptual nar-
owing” hypothesis (Scott et al., 2007), andproposals about
he increasing restriction of functional cortical areas with
evelopment (Durston et al., 2006). Interactive Specializa-
ion is also situated within a broader context of work on
neuroconstructivism” (Elman et al., 1996;Mareschal et al.,
007; Karmiloff-Smith, 2009).
. Predictions and hypotheses
Frameworks are useful for a variety of reasons, but par-
icularly so when they help to generate predictions that
irect research (albeit that they will not always make
pposingpredictions), andwhen theyoffer coherent expla-
ations of previously puzzling observations. Contrasting
redictions derived from the three frameworks have been
resented elsewhere (Johnson et al., 2002; Joseph et al.,
010), so for the present I will focus on predictions and
nterpretations offered by the IS view.
One set of predictions from the IS theory comes from the
Interactive”part, andanother set fromthe “Specialization”
art. To start with the latter, the hypothesized increase in
pecialization or tuning of activation of cortical regions has
number of consequences that generates testable predic-
ions. I will refer to these as Hypothesis S1, S2, S3 and so on.
ypothesis S1. Increased neural tuning or specialization
n response to a given stimulus or set of tasks demands
hould be observable as a more selective (or narrow)
esponse pattern. For example, unique ERP responses to
peciﬁc stimuli (such as upright human faces) observed in
dultswill emerge during development frommore broadly
uned responses that are initially elicited equally well by
losely related stimuli (such as inverted or non-human
aces) (de Haan et al., 2002).e Neuroscience 1 (2011) 7–21 11
Hypothesis S2. As a cortical region becomes more spe-
cialized (ﬁnely tuned) in its response properties it will
respond less to non-preferred stimulus or task contexts.
A consequence of this over many regions is that, for a given
stimulus presentation or task context, we should observe
a shrinkage or contraction of the extent of cortical tissue
activated (Hypothesis S2a). However, this prediction will
dependon the design of the functional imaging experiment
in question, and particularly on what types of control con-
ditions are subtracted or compared to the one of interest
(see also, Joseph et al., 2010). If the experimental design
and comparison conditions pose the question what corti-
cal tissue is sensitive to a given stimulus or task context
(e.g. by comparing to a general or unrelated baseline condi-
tion, such faces versus a ﬁxation cross), the IS view predicts
shrinkage of the activated area (Hypothesis S2a). In con-
trast, if the experimental design involves comparison of
two closely related stimuli or conditions (e.g. by comparing
faces to closelymatched objects); the question being posed
is what tissue is selective to that stimulus or task context.
In this case, IS predicts the emergence of response selective
tissuewith age (e.g. tissue that selectively responds to faces
more than closely matched objects) (Hypothesis S2b).4
Hypothesis S3. Changes in the degree of specialization
(S1) for a given stimulus or task will directly correlate with
changes in the degree of localization (S2) since, according
to IS, they reﬂect the same underlying processes.
Hypothesis S4. Plasticity following brain damage or sen-
sory deprivation will relate to the degree of functional
specialization already achieved in a given region. A region
that is already well specialized according to the criteria
above will, according to IS, be less plastic in response to
later life injury or deprivation. A region that is less spe-
cialized at a given age will have more options for future
specialization (be more plastic).
Turning to predictions derived from the “Interactive”
component of IS, several hypotheses derive from the view
that the specialization of regions is inﬂuenced by the pat-
terns of connectivity and the relative specializations, and
current degree of specialization, of connectivity neigh-
bours.
Hypothesis I1. During developmental change, neural
activation proﬁles will rarely if ever change only in single
regions. Rather, developmental change in cognitive skillsgreater response to faces than to other complex objects and a greater
response relative to baseline. My usage of stimulus-sensitive corresponds
to their categories of conjoined and non-speciﬁc in relation to faces, i.e.
patterns of activation that do not meet the criteria for stimulus-selective
(above) but where faces (or the stimulus in question) shows activation
greater than baseline.
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larger right FFAand left parahippocampal volumesof selec-
tive activation in adults than in children.
Predictions derived from the IS approach as applied to
the human face network have been most rigorously tested
5 Not all developmental fMRI studies have reported changes in FFA dur-
ing development as described in the main text. For example, Pelphrey
et al. (2009) report adult-like responses in FFA, EBA, and the parahip-
pocampal place area from ages 7 to 11 years. However, while an FFA was
detectable in children, and voxels in that region showed the same degree
of speciﬁcity seen in adults, many fewer voxels (around half) were clas-
siﬁed as showing a face-selective response in children than in aduts (see
also Cantlon et al., 2010). Thus, in accord with the results described in the
main text, some evidence for an increase in the extent of face-selective
tissue was provided. One currently unpublished study cited in secondary
sources (Kanwisher, 2010), suggests that there may be no developmental12 M.H. Johnson / Developmental
Hypothesis I2. The process of specialization will scale-
up from regions to networks. The activation of networks
of regions will, as a whole, become more selective to given
stimulus or tasks contexts during development.
Hypothesis I3. The specialization of individual regions
will be shaped by their involvement in one or more func-
tional networks.
In the context of these hypotheses, I now review evi-
dence, primarily from functional imaging studies, from
several different domains in which the IS approach has
been used to account for developmental change.
5. Face perception
Face perception has been a primary target domain for
investigating issues about the emergence of specializa-
tion for a deﬁned cortical function (Johnson et al., 2009;
Cohen-Kadosh and Johnson, 2007; Kanwisher, 2010). From
adult neuroimaging research we have an understanding
of how and where faces are represented in the mature
adult brain, including describing a “core” and “extended”
network (Allison et al., 1994; Haxby et al., 1994, 2000).
However, while we have some understanding of the neural
substrate in adults, continuing debate focuses on the unre-
solved question whether face-sensitive cortical areas are
unique for faces as a stimulus group (‘domain speciﬁcity’,
Kanwisher, 2010; maturational framework), or whether
such specialization is due to extensive perceptual train-
ing (‘expertise approach’, Gauthier and Nelson, 2001; skill
learning framework). The IS framework potentially pro-
vides a mid-way account that involves both intrinsic and
extrinsic factors, and predicts changes in both the degree
of specialization and localization of face-evoked activity in
cortex during development. Recently, several studies have
used functional MRI to investigate face processing in chil-
dren (for reviews see Cohen-Kadosh and Johnson, 2007;
Joseph et al., 2010), and the majority of these studies have
yielded support for the dynamic changes predicted by IS
theory.
With regard to Hypothesis S1 (increased neural tuning
or specialization in response to a given stimulus) several
developmental fMRI studies have provided relevant evi-
dence showing an increasing degree of tuning to faces in
the core face network (e.g. Aylward et al., 2005; Gathers et
al., 2004; Golarai et al., 2007; Scherf et al., 2007; Thomas
et al., 2001; Joseph et al., 2010). For example, Gathers et al.
(2004) with two groups of children (5–8, and 9–11 years)
and adults showed that in spite of similar activation lev-
els in the fusiform gyrus (FG) for the different age groups,
only the 9–11-year olds show the commonly reported
face-preferential, specialized responses in comparison to
objects. Similarly, Aylward et al. (2005) compared the func-
tional anatomy for faces versus houses in two different age
groups (children aged 8–10 years, and 10–12 years) and
found increased bilateral selective activation for faces in
the older children in comparison to the younger children,
a ﬁnding which correlated with the behavioural results.
Hence, these fMRI studies support the notion that face pro-
cessing becomes more specialized with increasing age (see
de Haan et al., 2002 for converging evidence from ERPs).e Neuroscience 1 (2011) 7–21
Turning toHypothesis S2, recall that if the experimental
design and comparison conditions pose the question what
cortical tissue is sensitive to a given stimulus or task con-
text (e.g. by comparing to a general or unrelated baseline
condition), the IS view predicts shrinkage of the activated
area (Hypothesis S2a). In contrast, if the experimental
design involves comparison of two closely related stimuli
or conditions (e.g. by comparing faces to closely matched
objects); the question being posed is what tissue is selec-
tive to that stimulus or task context. In this case, IS predicts
the emergence of response selective tissue with age (e.g.
tissue that selectively responds to faces more than closely
matched objects; Hypothesis S2b). With regard to these
localization hypotheses, most currently published studies5
have found evidence for dynamic changes in the extent of
cortical tissue activated between children and adults (e.g.
Gathers et al., 2004; Golarai et al., 2007; Passarotti et al.,
2003; Scherf et al., 2007), and at least three report the acti-
vation of additional areas that are not typically found in
the mature adult brain, such as the left and right inferior
frontal gyrus (Gathers et al., 2004; Passarotti et al., 2003;
Joseph et al., 2010).
Of the studies mentioned above, two are of particu-
lar relevance as they speciﬁcally address both Hypotheses
S1 and S2. Scherf et al. (2007) used naturalistic movies of
faces, objects, buildings and navigation scenes in a passive
viewing task with children (5–8 years), adolescents (11–14
years) and adults. They found that the children exhib-
ited similar patterns of activation of the face-processing
areas commonly reported in adults (such as the fusiform
face area (FFA)). However, this activation was not selective
for the category of face stimuli; the regions were equally
strongly activated by objects and landscapes. Moreover,
this lack of ﬁne-tuning of classical face-processing areas
stood in contrast to distinct preferential activation pat-
terns for other object categories (occipital object areas
and the parahippocampal place area). In a similar study,
Golarai et al. (2007) tested children (7–11 years), adoles-
cents (12–16 years) and adultswith static object categories
(faces, objects, places and scrambled abstract patterns).
Consistent with Hypothesis S2b they found substantiallychange in the FFA when children from 5 years old are scanned using a
number of different data acquisition and analysis methods that improve
signal-to-noise ratio. However, it remains puzzling why neighbouring
object-sensitive regions did not show similar developmental changes in
all the previous studies – that also used a variety of different scanners,
headcoils, and analytical methods.
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y Joseph et al. (2010). In addition to their systematic
onﬁrmation of the predictions above (as compared to pre-
ictions from the maturational framework), these authors
stablished that patterns of selective activation change
cross multiple regions in a way consistent with the whole
etwork adjusting response properties of component
egions to increase or optimise their overall function-
ng (Hypothesis I1). Cohen-Kadosh et al. (Submitted for
ublication) have exploredwhether the specialization pro-
ess scales-up from regions to networks in the sense that
he activation of networks becomesmore selective to given
timulus or tasks contexts during development (Hypoth-
sis I2). This was done by varying task demands while
articipants viewed an ongoing sequence of face stimuli
hat varied in identity, expression, or eye gaze (Cohen-
adosh et al., 2010). These authors observed that the
egions of the core face network became increasingly coor-
inated and integrated in their responses properties with
evelopment and, further, that the functional connectiv-
ty between regions of the network was modulated by task
emands in adults, but was not in children. Thus, the selec-
ivity of the response of the core face network as a whole
nly became selectively tuned to speciﬁc task demands
ater in development. Given the variety of different per-
eptual computations we perform on faces (expression,
dentity, eye gaze etc), they may be an ideal stimulus for
xploring the specialization of network activation patterns
n response to differing task demands.
Another area of face-processing research that could
otentially contribute to our understanding of the devel-
pmental trajectory of face-specialized cortical areas is
he work on developmental prosopagnosia. Develop-
ental prosopagnosia refers to individuals who never
evelop typical adult face-processing abilities (Duchaine
nd Nakayama, 2006), and in particular facial identity
ecognition skills. This condition can occur in the absence
f any obvious sensory or intellectual deﬁcit (Avidan et
l., 2005). Moreover, while there are cases of develop-
ental prosopagnosia that arise from brain trauma early
n life, there is increasing evidence for cases in which
ypical adult-like face-processing skills fail to develop in
he absence of any known acquired injury (Duchaine and
akayama, 2006). Functional MRI studies have generally
hown that developmental prosopagnosics activate face-
ensitive regions of cortex (for review see Duchaine and
akayama, 2006). However, the degree of selectivity of this
esponse remains indoubt, andaplausible interpretationof
hese results is that while adult developmental prosopag-
osics show activation in face-sensitive regions, they may
lso show the lack of speciﬁcity in this response reported
arlier for typically developing children. Moreover, Avidan
t al. (2005) showed using fMRI that in four developmen-
al prosopagnosics face perception recruited additional
rain areas (e.g. the inferior frontal gyrus) that were not
ommonly found in typical adults. Interestingly however,
nferior frontal gyrus activation has been observed in chil-
ren in several of the developmental neuroimaging studies
eported above (Scherf et al., 2007; Passarotti et al., 2003,
007; Gathers et al., 2004). Thus, predictions from IS
ccounts for data from developmental prosopagnosia in
erms of delayed or impaired specialization process.e Neuroscience 1 (2011) 7–21 13
If this account of developmental prosopagnosia is cor-
rect then with sufﬁcient training on faces the selectivity of
the response of cortical areas, and their inter-connectivity,
should change toward the typical adult pattern. This
was tested in a training study with a developmental
prosopagnosic that showed that as behavioural perfor-
mance improved the selectivity of cortical processing of
faces (as measured by the N170 component) increased
(DeGutis et al., 2007). Further, these authors also observed
increased functional connectivity between face-selective
regions as measured by fMRI, particularly the right occip-
ital face area and the right fusiform face area. In short, the
functional anatomy and behavioural abilities exhibited by
developmental prosopagnosics are reminiscent of the ﬁnd-
ings obtained in developmental neuroimaging studies (see
above), in which children exhibit neural activity for faces
in the brain areas typically found adults, but this activa-
tion, while less reliably localized is also still far from being
face-specialized. Further studies on both adults and chil-
dren suffering from developmental prosopagnosia will be
needed to shed light on this issue.
6. The social brain and social cognition
Beyond faceperception and the core facenetwork, other
regions in what has become known as the social brain net-
work are thought to help support more complex aspects
of social perception and cognition. Another cortical area
known to respond to social stimuli, and also implicated in
social perception, is the Superior Temporal Suclus (STS)
(Allison et al., 2000). In adults, the response properties
of portions of the STS are highly speciﬁc. For example,
while STS responds to moving biological stimuli, it does
not respond as well to non-biological similar moving stim-
uli, or to static pictures of biological stimuli (Puce et al.,
1998). In addition, several frontal and prefrontal areas are
also known to be activated during social cognition com-
putations (Frith and Frith, 1999, 2006). In particular, there
are now several fMRI studies with children of various ages
using different tasks showing that medial prefrontal cortex
(MPFC) is consistently activated when children engage in
mentalizing or other aspects of human social interaction
(Blakemore et al., 2007; Kobayashi et al., 2007; Ohnishi
et al., 2004; Pfeifer et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2006). Can
these developmental changes be interpreted within the IS
framework?
In relation to Hypothesis S1 (increased neural tuning or
specialization) developmental neuroimaging studies show
that STS can be activated by dynamic social stimuli from
at least mid-childhood (Mosconi et al., 2005), and probably
even during infancy (Lloyd-Fox et al., 2009). The observa-
tion that regions that will become part of the adult social
brain are activated by social stimuli in a broadly tuned way
from early in life is entirely consistent with the IS theory.
While the degree of specialization of the STS response dur-
ing infancy remains to be determined, Carter and Pelphrey
(2006) used fMRI to test the speciﬁcity of response of the
STS and other regions in 7- and 10-year old children while
theyviewedavariety of biologicalmotionand related stim-
uli (such as walking robots). They observed that, consistent
withHypothesis S1, the STS became increasingly speciﬁc in
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its responseproperties tobiologicalmotionwith increasing
age. While research on the STS is clearly not as advanced as
that on the FFA, the evidence currently available indicates
that similarprocessesof emerging functional specialization
may occur.
With regard to dynamic changes in the spatial extent of
cortical regions activated in response to social cognition
(Hypothesis S2), in all of the currently published devel-
opmental studies of MPFC, children recruited MPFC more
extensively thanadultswhenengaged inmentalizing tasks,
even when task performance and possible baseline dif-
ferences were controlled for (see Johnson et al., 2009 for
review). For example, Wang et al. (2006) employed an
irony task to investigate the comprehension of commu-
nicative intentions from cartoons in adults and children
(9–14 years), and found that children recruited MPFC and
left inferior frontal gyrus to a greater extent than adults,
whereas adults recruited the FG, extrastriate areas and the
amygdala more strongly than children. Furthermore in a
correlation analysis the authors showed that, within the
group of children, there was a positive correlation between
age and FG activity and a negative correlation of age with
extent of MPFC activity. Similarly, Blakemore et al. (2007)
reported that adolescent participants (12–18 years) when
thinking about intentions showed more extensive activ-
ity in MPFC than adults, whereas adults activated parts of
the right STS more than adolescents. Two other develop-
mental mentalizing studies available revealed very similar
patterns of ﬁndings. Pfeifer et al. (2007) examined brain
activity during self-knowledge retrieval and found that 10-
year-old children engaged MPFC to a greater extent than
did adults. Kobayashi et al. (2007) presented adults and
children (8–11 years) with theory of mind tasks and also
reported that the children showed more activity in MPFC
than adults, but that adults exhibited great activity in the
right amygdala than children. Taken together, these studies
consistently show that with age the extent of MPFC activa-
tionduringmentalizing tasks becomesmore focal,whereas
activity in posterior (temporal) cortical areas sometimes
increases.
While currently there have been no systematic investi-
gations of changing patterns of selective activation across
multiple brain regions, Hypotheses I1 is clearly supported
by evidence from MPFC studies showing that while the
extent of activation decreases with development in late
childhood resulting in the focal selective activation of spe-
cialized sub-regions of MPFC in adults, there is also a
corresponding increase in the extent of activation in more
posterior regions suchas FFAandSTS. Thus, thenetworksof
regions composing the social brain are likely to be adapting
their functionality within the context of a whole emerg-
ing network. Clearly, only further studies, or appropriate
re-analyses of existing data, can deﬁnitively address this
issue.
7. Word learning, reading, and visual word-form
system
Infants tend to initially learn words relatively slowly,
but at about 18–20 months infants typically show a rapid
increase in the production ofwords, often called the vocab-e Neuroscience 1 (2011) 7–21
ulary spurtor thenamingexplosion. Someresearchershave
speculated that this sudden increased ability is correlated
with changes in organization of language-relevant brain
regions (Mills et al., 1993). One study used ERPs to inves-
tigate the neural correlates of processing of known and
unknown words in children before and after the vocabu-
lary spurt. The results showed that before the vocabulary
spurt, the amplitudes of ERPs from 200 to 400ms were
larger to known than unknown words. These ERP differ-
ences were broadly distributed over anterior and posterior
regions of both the left and right hemispheres. In contrast,
for 20-month olds, who had vocabularies over 150 words,
ERP differences from 200 to 400ms were more focally
distributed over temporal and parietal regions of the left
hemisphere. A subsequent analysis that compared children
with different vocabulary sizes but with age held constant
showed that this shift in brain response was more directly
related to vocabulary than to age. These results, and those
of similar studies, are consistent with Hypothesis S2 in that
they show a more focal pattern of activation with increas-
ing age and experience.
Another aspect of language processing in the brain that
involves experience is learning to read. Reading involves
linking the visual word form with the sound structure of
language and interpreting its meaning. The development
of reading poses a somewhat different challenge than the
development of the ability to perceive and produce spo-
ken language. Unlike the latter abilities, which seem to
unfold without special effort as children develop, reading
is a relatively recent development in human history that is
acquired through explicit teaching and much practice. In
this way, studying the acquisition of reading provides an
interesting opportunity for investigating how experience
impacts brain function during development.
One set of brain areas that have been intensively stud-
ied in this respect is the ‘visual word-form system’ (VWFS).
The visual word-form system in adults is within the
left occipto-temporal cortex, centred on the mid-fusiform
gyrus, and shows a tuned response to visual word forms
compared to other complex visual stimuli. The VWFS
appears to be involved in perceptual expertise for word
recognition that allows words to be perceived and pro-
cessed quickly and automatically in skilled readers (e.g.
Brem et al., 2010).
Important changes have been observed in activation of
the VWFS over the years when children begin to learn
to read. In a recent review, Schlaggar and McCandliss
(2007) used the IS framework to interpret wide-ranging
evidence on the neural changes associated with learning to
read. Summarising the results from several developmental
fMRI studies they state: “Developmental functional imag-
ing results from several groups are beginning to converge
on a central conclusion regarding developmental changes
in extrastriate regions involved in reading. During the ages
when reading skill is acquired, a transition occurs from
bilateral extrastriate region involvement for reading to a
predominance of left (relative to right) ventral occipito-
temporal cortex involvement. This ﬁnding was evident in
several large cross-sectional developmental fMRI studies
of reading-related tasks (Schlaggar et al., 2002; Shaywitz et
al., 2004; Brown et al., 2005) described above. Additionally,
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den and co-workers (Turkeltaub et al., 2003) reported a
imilarpattern in their large cross-sectionaldevelopmental
MRI study that relatedageandvariousmeasuresof linguis-
ic skill to activation elicited by an implicit reading task.
hey showed an age-related decline in right extrastriate
ctivity, whereas homologous left cortical regions main-
ained their level of activity across agegroups”. Thechanges
ummarised by Schlaggar and McCandliss (2007) clearly
rovide support for Hypothesis S2a in that they show
transition to more focal patterns of specialized tissue
ith experience and development, although closer anal-
sis of the different comparisons and conditions employed
n these studies is obviously required. Again, the changes in
WFS occur within a context of changes in patterns of acti-
ation (such as those in the right hemisphere), providing
t least preliminary support for Hypothesis I1.
The dynamic changes in the extent of cortical tissue
ctivated in response to visual word forms can also be
bserved with other imaging methods. For example, ERP
tudies have also been employed to investigate the devel-
pment of theVWFS, as this region is believed to contribute
o the N170 ERP component elicited by visual words. In
dults, the N170 for visual words is left lateralised, and this
patial distributionof the response is believed tobe a signa-
ure of perceptual expertise of visual words as opposed to
ther forms of perceptual expertise (e.g. for faces; Maurer
t al., 2008). Preschoolers’ N170’s for words are slow and
o not show sensitivity to words or letters (Maurer et al.,
005); however after a year and a half of reading instruc-
ion, reading ﬂuency correlated with the degree to which
he N170 showed an adult-like response (Maurer et al.,
006). Overall, these ﬁndings provide convergent evidence
or the idea that perceptual expertise for recognising visual
ords involves a process whereby brain occipito-temporal
rain activity elicited to words becomes more speciﬁc to
ords (Hypothesis S1) and more focalized to the left hemi-
phere (Hypothesis S2).
Schlaggar and McCandliss (2007) conclude their review
f the neural basis of learning to read by saying “these
ndings converge to support the notion that the develop-
ent of ﬂuentword recognition is systematically related to
unctional reﬁnements in early perceptual processes. These
ovel perceptual abilities, which are triggered during the
rst few hundred ms of processing a visual word, undergo
onsiderable experience-dependent reﬁnement manifest
s more focal, left-lateralized patterns as reading experi-
nce develops”. The process described is clearly consistent
ith the IS framework.
Very recent studies have reinforced and ampliﬁed this
onclusion. For example, Bitan et al. (2009) examined
he developmental changes in interactions among brain
egions while children performed rhyming judgements
n visually presented words. The authors interpret their
esults in terms of the increasing inﬂuence of frontal
egions over temporal cortical areas in the left hemisphere.
n older, but not younger, children top–down control
rocesses mediated by frontal structures may selectively
nhance the sensitivity of lateral temporal cortex to input
nformation from the fusiform gyrus. This discovery is
ighly consistent with Hypotheses I1 and I2 in that it
hows the gradual emergence of a coordinated and spe-e Neuroscience 1 (2011) 7–21 15
cialized network of regions. In another recent study, Brem
et al. (2010) collected both MRI and ERP data from chil-
dren in the context of a reading skills training study. They
demonstrated that the learning of letter-speech sound cor-
respondences in young non-reading children results in the
emergence of cortical tissue sensitive towords (as opposed
to false fonts) in occipital-temporal cortex. Print-selective
activation emerged as a direct of result of training in the
areas that will later become the adult VWFS (as measured
by fMRI) and in an N200 component of the ERP. This study
illustrates that at certain points in development even rel-
atively brief training (in this case 3–4h) can initiate the
specialization processes hypothesized by the IS framework
(Hypothesis S1).
8. Prefrontal cortex and executive control
One of the ﬁrst areas to be explored in developmental
fMRI studies was the prefrontal cortex and its associ-
ated executive control functions. For example, Casey et al.
(1997) and Thomas et al. (1999) administered a “go/no-go”
task to assess inhibitory control and frontal lobe function
to healthy volunteers from 7 years of age to adult. The task
involved participants responding to a number of letters,
but withholding their response to a rarely occurring “X”.
More than twice the volume of prefrontal cortex activity
(dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) was observed in children
compared to adults. One explanation of this ﬁnding is
that children found the task more difﬁcult and demanding
than adults. However, children with error rates similar to
those in adults showed some of the largest volumes of pre-
frontal activity suggesting that task difﬁculty was not the
important factor. These ﬁndings are clearly puzzling when
viewed from the context of the maturational framework,
but are consistent with Hypothesis S2 discussed earlier.
Evidence in support of Hypothesis S2 has been the
explicit topic of debate within this domain. Durston et
al. (2006) marshalled evidence from several developmen-
tal fMRI studies of prefrontal cortex activation consistent
with a shift from “diffuse to focal” cortical activity dur-
ing development. Speciﬁcally, in a combined longitudinal
and cross-sectional study they observed attenuated activ-
ity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortical areas, in addition to
increased focal activation in ventral prefrontal regions that
was related to performance in a target detection task. In
this study the authors dissociated the extent of cortical tis-
sue activated (whole-brain analyses) from the changes in
activation amplitude (ROI analyses), and observed a devel-
opmental and performance-related trend fromwidespread
lower activation to more focal but greater activation. These
changes seem entirely consistent with a tuning process
in which one region increasingly becomes increasingly
specialized for a speciﬁc computation to the exclusion of
others.
Hypothesis I1 (developmental change in cognitive skills
or behaviour will be accompanied widespread changes
across multiple regions) has also been explicitly addressed
in the domain of cognitive control. For example, Luna et
al. (2001) tested participants aged 8–30 years in an occu-
lomotor response-suppression task to see which regions
“matured” over this age period. Their behavioural results
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showed that the adult level of ability to inhibit pre-
potent responses developed gradually through childhood
and adolescence. The difference between pro-saccade and
anti-saccade conditions were investigated with functional
MRI, and revealed dynamic changing patterns of brain
activation during development. Both children and adoles-
cents had reduced amplitude of activation compared to
adults in some cortical areas (superior frontal eye ﬁelds,
intra-parietal sulcus), and also in several sub-cortical areas.
However, both children and adolescents also had activa-
tion in regions not found to show differences in adults. For
example, childrendisplayed increased relativeactivation in
the supramarginal gyrus compared to the other age groups,
and the adolescents showed greater differential activity in
the doroslateral prefrontal cortex than children or adults.
These ﬁndings illustrate the widespread network changes
in the neural basis of behaviour over developmental time,
with different patterns of activation being evident at dif-
ferent ages.
Another example of the development of prefrontal acti-
vation patterns during childhood comes from studies of
verbal ﬂuency tasks inwhich participants are asked to gen-
erate words in response to a cue (e.g. to generate examples
of a target category, or generate a verb that relates to a
cued noun). Several studies have shown that adults and
school age children (Hertz-Pannier et al., 1997; Gaillard et
al., 2000) typically activate left hemisphere frontal cortical
networks including Broca’s area, premotor, prefrontal and
supplementary motor areas as well as, less consistently,
temporal cortical areas including superior temporal, mid-
dle temporal and supramarginal gyri. In addition, some
degree of activation in homologous right frontal regions
is almost always found both in adults (Pujol et al., 1999;
Springer et al., 1999) and in children (Hertz-Pannier et al.,
1997; Gaillard et al., 2000). Two studies have found that
both the degree towhich activation is bilateral (rather than
left dominant) and the extent of this activation is greater
in children than in adults (Gaillard et al., 2000; Holland et
al., 2001). Thus, as in the other examples discussed above,
typical development is associated with a reduction in the
extent of activation of cortical areas and, as a consequence,
an increased lateralisation of activation to the left hemi-
sphere with age (Hypothesis S2).
9. Resting-state networks and spontaneous activity
To this point the majority of the examples we have
discussed have involved research on the emergence of
specialized functions in human cortex in speciﬁc regions
such as the FFA or VWFS. However, several of the predic-
tions from the IS viewpoint refer to our understanding of
how networks involving different regions, each with their
owndifferent specializations, emerge (Hypotheses I1–3). In
other words, while we have some good examples of func-
tional brain development at the level of individual cortical
regions,we are still largely in the dark about how the larger
scale of cortical function in terms of networks of regions
develops (Johnson and Munakata, 2005; Stevens, 2009).
Some recent studies have sought to address this issue
by examining resting-state networks during development.
While data from resting-state networks cannot be usede Neuroscience 1 (2011) 7–21
to make direct inferences about specialization in response
to task contexts, functional resting states are thought to
reﬂect recent experience as well as being constrained by
the current neuroanatomy (for review see Uddin et al.,
2010).
One example of this line of work comes from Fair et
al. (2007, 2009) who used functional connectivity anal-
yses in fMRI to study resting state “control” networks
in school age children and adults. Their analysis allows
them to infer the nature and strength of functional con-
nections between 39 different cortical regions. They found
that development entailed both segregation (i.e. decreased
short-range connectivity) and integration (i.e. increased
long-range connectivity) of brain regions that contribute
to a functional network. In a similar study, the gen-
eral developmental transition from more local functional
connectivity to greater and stronger long-range network
connectivity was conﬁrmed using slightly different meth-
ods and 90 different cortical and sub-cortical regions
(Supekar et al., 2009).
Assuming that the process underlying resting activity
mirror to some extent those during recent task-dependent
activation, the decrease in short-range inter-regional func-
tional connectivity is readily explicable in terms of the IS
view. As neighbouring regions of cortical tissue become
increasingly specialized for different functions (e.g. faces
versus objects), they will less commonly be co-activated.
This process may also involve synaptic pruning and has
been simulated in neural network models of cortex in
which nodes with similar response properties cluster
together spatially distinct from nodes with other response
properties (e.g.Oliveret al., 1996). Thus, decreasingdegrees
of functional connectivity between neighbouring areas of
cortex is readily predicted by models implementing prin-
ciples of the IS view (see also Cantlon et al., 2010).
More challenging to the IS framework is to account
for the increase in long-range functional connections. A
maturational explanation of the increase in long-range
functional connectivity would suggest that this increase
is due to the establishment or strengthening of the rel-
evant ﬁbre bundles. However, the increase in functional
connectivity during development may occur after the rel-
evant long-range ﬁbre bundles are in place (see Fair et al.,
2009; Supekar et al., 2009 for discussion) suggesting that
we still require an account of why functional connectivity
may expand from local to long-range.
One proposal is that the strengthening and mainte-
nance of long-range brain connections is at least partially
an activity-dependent aspect of brain development reﬂect-
ing networks of regions that are commonly co-activated in
speciﬁc task contexts. This raises the question of why and
how do particular anatomically distant brain regions begin
to cooperate in a functional network?A speculative answer
to this question may lie in scaling up the basic mecha-
nisms of Hebbian learning. It may be that regions that
tend to be co-activated in a frequently encountered task
context strengthen or maintain the connections between
them. While each region is becoming individually special-
ized for a particular function, this intra-region change in
specialization is modulated and inﬂuenced by its presence
within an emerging network of co-activated structures. For
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xample, in a task that requires visually guided action,
variety of visual and motor areas will be co-activated
long with multi-modal integration areas. If the task is
epeated sufﬁcientlyoften then thesepatternsof functional
o-activation will be strengthened, and the specialization
f individual regions forming the network will proceed
ithin this context of overall patterns of activation. These
stablished patterns of functional co-activation may then
ecome incorporated into resting-state networks (Lewis et
l., 2009; Uddin et al., 2010) which themselves inﬂuence
he patterns of activation observed in subsequent tasks
Zhanget al., 2009). Thus, commonlyencountered task con-
exts, such as face-to-face social interaction with another
uman, may induce increasingly embedded and special-
zed patterns of network activation.
Another reason why anatomically distant regions may
trengthen and maintain their connectivity relates to the
act that most of the long-range functional connections
tudied by Fair et al. (2007) involved links to parts of the
refrontal cortex. Thispart of the cortex is generally consid-
red tohavea special roleduringdevelopment in childhood
nd skill acquisition in adults (Thatcher, 1992; Gilbert and
igman, 2007). Indeed, PFC may play a role in orchestrat-
ng the collective functional organization of other cortical
egions during development (see Section 10).
0. Discussion
In the previous sections I have illustrated the potential
f the IS framework to explain dynamic changes in corti-
al activation patterns in a domain-general way. As stated
arlier, this will not remove the need for more detailed
omain-speciﬁc theories tobedevelopedwithin the frame-
ork. I now consider some other areas and domains in
hich the IS framework could potentially be applied over
he next fewyears, butwhere there is currently a paucity of
elevant data. Then I will go on to review some challenges
nd caveats to the IS framework, before closing with some
roposals for future directions.
It will be evident to most readers that the IS framework
as implications broader than the typical development
f human brain functions, and some of these implica-
ions have already been explored in considerable detail
lsewhere (Johnson et al., 2002). The key points are that
ome developmental disorders can be characterised as
aving delayed processes of specialization (resulting in
ore widespread and less stimulus or task-speciﬁc pat-
erns of cortical activation), or as having atypical patterns
f specialization (tuning cortical areas to stimuli or tasks
n ways that differ from the typical pattern). An example
f the former comes from some studies of developmental
rosopagnosia, whichwas discussed earlier. An example of
he latter may be the residual atypical associations symp-
omatic of synaesthesia (Cohen-Kadosh et al., 2009).
There seems little doubt that the IS framework could
e applied to domains other than those discussed earlier
see Johnson, 2011). Among several candidate domains
s that of number. One view of the acquisition of num-
er skills is that during infancy numbers do not have a
nique representation (Rips et al., 2008), and other non-
umerical dimensions, separately or jointly, can serve ase Neuroscience 1 (2011) 7–21 17
cues in order to detect changes in quantity/magnitude. A
likely reason for this might be a shared magnitude mech-
anism for non-numerical dimensions such as size, density,
time, that precedes neurons that are specialized for numer-
ical magnitude (Walsh, 2003). In this scenario, different
magnitudes, possibly also including numbers, are jointly
represented from infancy (Cohen Kadosh and Walsh, 2008;
Feigenson, 2007). Later, in development, there is a hypoth-
esized increase in the specialization of the neural tissue
underlyingcomputations fornumbers, leading to theemer-
gence of speciﬁcally tuned neuronal circuits for numerical
magnitude (Cohen Kadosh and Walsh, 2008). This view of
the emergence of number systems in the brain is consis-
tent with some emerging evidence from developmental
imaging. While regions responsive to number may be acti-
vated from 4 years old or earlier (Cantlon et al., 2006),
left fusiform regions that are selective to letters in adults
are equally activated by numbers in 4–5-year old children
(Cantlon et al., 2010). This suggests that numbers and let-
ters may have much more overlapping neural processing
prior to signiﬁcant education. Such emerging ﬁndings are,
at least in general terms, consistent with the IS frame-
work, and seem worthy of more detailed investigation in
the future.
10.1. Challenges and caveats
Some have suggested that patterns of shrinkage of cor-
tical activation could be artefacts of functional methods
and/or analyses. For example, some activation maps that
include more errors in task performance show a qualita-
tively greater spatial extent of activation and lower peak
signal magnitudes (Brown et al., 2006). While such factors
could account for the results from some individual studies,
the large number of functional MRI studies from different
labs, in different domains, with different data acquisition
and analysis methods, and including some studies match-
ing for behavioural performance across age, make any
single methodological explanation unlikely. Further, con-
verging results have been obtained with other methods,
such as ERP, making it even more unlikely that one, or a
few, methodological factors account for these trends in the
data.
Another potential criticism is of the IS framework itself,
rather than the supporting data. This criticism is that sub-
sets of the results described above are also consistent with
either the maturational or skill learning frameworks. For
example, the emergence of face-selective cortical tissue
during childhood could also be consistent with a matura-
tional view in which it is argued that region-speciﬁc gene
expression changes the intrinsic connectivity of FFA, or
its biochemical milieu, to enable adult functioning. Joseph
et al. (2010) have addressed this issue in considerable
detail arguing that while the maturational view predicts
increases in the extent of stimulus or task-speciﬁc tissue,
only the IS framework also predicts shrinkage of stimu-
lus or task sensitive tissue in the context of network-wide
adjustments to functioning. This illustrates the status of IS
as a framework or general theory which generates a series
of predictions, only a sub-set of which will discriminate
it from other frameworks or perspectives. As discussed
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earlier, it is the overall scope and breadth of data that
it accounts for that will ultimately determine its success.
Having said this, additional data can often help discrimi-
nate between the frameworks outlined earlier. To return to
theexampleof theemergenceof stimulus-selectivecortical
tissue with experience or development, the maturational
and IS frameworks make different predictions about the
functional state of an area preceding its change to become
stimulus-selective (see also Joseph et al., 2010, their Table
1). The IS framework predicts that an area will become
increasingly specialized for a function, and thus will go
frombeingmorebroadly tuned, and responsive to the stim-
ulus in question, to more narrowly tuned and responding
to the given stimulus only. In contrast, according to the
maturational view it is possible that an area not previously
sensitive to a given stimulus couldmature directly to selec-
tively responding to that stimulus. The prediction from
the IS framework has been conﬁrmed for face processing
(Joseph et al., 2010).
As stated in Section 1, the IS framework is intended
as potentially a domain-general framework for interpret-
ing a variety of data on the emergence of human brain
functions. A potential criticism of this approach is that dif-
ferent functional areas in the cortex may arise due to quite
different neurodevelopmental mechanisms. For example,
Kanwisher (2010) argues that while the visual word-form
area may emerge developmentally through mechanisms
akin to those described in this paper, the FFA arises because
“the speciﬁc instructions for constructing the critical cir-
cuits for face perception are in the genome”. In other
words, different functionally deﬁned cortical areas (even
corresponding areas in the two hemispheres) result from
fundamentally different neurodevelopmental factors. In
contrast to this view, many developmental neuroscience
studies suggest a vast majority of common basic mecha-
nisms of neural plasticity and representation across large
extents of cortex (for review see Kingsbury and Finlay,
2001), albeit with possible differences in the timing of
developmental events. Clearly, only further research will
resolve these matters.
Anticipating another source of potential criticism, the
traditional nature–nurture debate continues to polarise
discussion in some domains of cognitive and language
development. With its emphasis on activity-dependent
processes of change, the IS framework may be perceived
by some as supporting empiricist or learning accounts of
developmental change, in contrast to those who argue for
the maturation of innate modules. While the IS framework
undoubtedly has different underlying assumptions, and
some different predictions, from the maturational frame-
work, an emphasis on activity-dependent specialization
does not directly equate to experience-driven learning. As
we saw in the previous section on resting states, intrin-
sic brain activity may be a greatly underestimated source
of functional activity that could potentially help sculpt
emerging connectivity patterns during development. This
intrinsic activity of the brain remains poorly understood,
but is likely to reﬂect both the brains current state of con-
nectivity and its recent history of functional activity.
A related criticism of the IS framework is the claim
that it assumes that all cortical areas are equipotential,e Neuroscience 1 (2011) 7–21
and that this is implausible. Although, as stated earlier,
the IS framework assumes that inter-regional connections
are as important as intrinsic connectivity in determining
a regions functionality, this does not mean that all corti-
cal regions start with equal potential. According to the IS
view, small-scale areas of cortex become tuned for certain
functions as a result of a combination of factors, includ-
ing (i) the suitability or otherwise of the biases within
the large-scale region (e.g. transmitter types and levels,
synaptic density, etc.), (ii) the information within the sen-
sory inputs (sometimes partly determined by other brain
systems), and (iii) competitive interactions with neigh-
bouring regions (so that functions are not duplicated). In
addition to these constraints, particular regions appear
to be situated within a context of connectivity that gives
them a greater inﬂuence over emerging functionality in
other regions. Asmentioned earlier, the prefrontal cortex is
generally considered to have a special role during develop-
ment in childhood and skill acquisition in adults (Thatcher,
1992; Gilbert and Sigman, 2007). Johnson (2011) reviewed
a number of studies consistent with the idea that PFC may
play a role in orchestrating the collective functional orga-
nization of other cortical regions during development.
10.2. Future directions
The putative role of the PFC in constraining emerging
functions in other regions illustrates a future challenge
for the development of the IS framework. To date, most
examples of how regions interact and compete to acquire
functions have involved horizontal interactions between
regions at approximately equivalent stages of neural com-
putation. However, it seems evident that similar principles
apply to vertical interactions within the brain where one
structure provides top–down feedback to inﬂuence the
emergence of functionality in another (Stevens, 2009).
In this regard, analyses of resting-state functional con-
nectivity have shown that adult networks have a more
hierarchical structure that is optimally connected to sup-
port top–down relations between one part of the network
and another (Supekar et al., 2009).
One of the features of a hierarchical network is the
capacity for one region to feedback highly processed sen-
sory or motor input to the earlier stages of processing. In
much the same way as we hypothesized that lateral inter-
regional interactions help shape the intrinsic connectivity
of areas to result in functional specialization, interactions
between regions connected by feedback and feedforward
connections may also help shape the functional special-
ization of the areas involved. Top–down effects play an
important role in sensory information processing in the
adult brain (e.g. Siegel et al., 2000). For example, during
perception, informationpropagates through thevisual pro-
cessing hierarchy from primary sensory areas to higher
cortical regions, while feedback connections convey infor-
mation in the reverse direction. In a neurocomputational
model of feedback in visual processing in the adult brain,
Spratling and Johnson (2004) demonstrated that a number
of different phenomena associated with visual attention,
ﬁgure/ground segmentation, and contextual cueing could
all be accounted for by a common mechanism underlying
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ortical feedback. Extending these ideas to development,
here are potentially two important implications of feed-
ack that will beneﬁt from future exploration. The ﬁrst of
hese will be to examine how the specialization of early
ensory areas is shaped by top–down feedback, and vice
ersa, during development. The second topic for investiga-
ionwill be to examine the consequences of relatively noisy
r poor quality cortical feedback in the immature cortex.
Finally, it will be evident that some of the predictions of
he IS framework presented earlier are yet to be seriously
ested, and all of them still require thorough assessment
n different domains (e.g. S3, S4). In particular, relating
hanges in neuroanatomical measures of connectivity to
unctional changes will be critical for the detailed conﬁr-
ation of the general theory presented here.
1. Conclusions
A framework for interpreting and guiding research on
uman functional brain development has been presented.
hile not all predictions made by the general theory are
nique, when assessed as a whole over a number of differ-
nt domains the predictions are largely upheld by current
ata. Most importantly, the framework potentially pro-
ides a structured agenda for future research, and allows
or generation of domain-speciﬁc theories within it.
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